



Empowering a Small Security Team

October 26, 2016

Meet Your Panelists



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It's Interactive



Please submit your questions through the control panel to get answers LIVE from our panelists.



EnergySec is hosting an online chat to accompany this webinar which is open to all registered EnergySec Community participants.

To join the chat as a guest, visit:

https://hipchat.energysec.org/g0kGNyQRW

If you have a HipChat account already, join us in the room titled, EVENT: EnergySec Webinar Chat. Note: Registered users have access to the chat history, file attachments, and links.

Agenda

Challenges
Small Teams
Face

ProtectWise Demo

Q&A










PROACTIVE REACTIVE

Security Analytics Goals

Goal 1: Warp Time

Goal 2: Cut the noise

Goal 3: Focus



Scale The Advanced Humans!

The Analytics Kill Chain



Reconnaissance

Attacker locates a security gap

Delivery

Attacker delivers malicious payload

Exploit

Victim executes malicious payload

Beaconing

Infected host phones home

Command & Control

Attacker takes control of victim host

Fortification

Lateral movement and entrenchment

Actions on Objectives

Data Theft





Analytics Framework

Signatures + Intelligence & Machine Behavioral Analysis Enrichment Heuristics Learning **Decision**



Signatures

Example: Bedep

IDS Signature:

```
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"Bedep HTTP POST CnC Beacon";
flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:".php"; http_uri;
fast_pattern:only; content:!"Content-Type|3a|"; http_header; content:"Accept|3a 20|text/html,
application/xhtml+xml, */*|0d 0a|"; http_header; pcre:"/\.php(?:\?[a-zA-Z0-9=&]+)?$/U"; pcre:"/^[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))(?;&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}))*(?:&[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=(?:[a-z]+\d*=
```

File Signature (hash):

ef0503a22a0a359bcb82ff2ef57907a0b2cabf3a145b661d053d42fba712a073



Signatures in Real Life

Kill Chain Coverage

Recon	Delivery	Exploitation	Beacon	C2	Fortification	Theft
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Very good at detecting known exploits

Very bad at detecting 0 days – *Unless you save PCAP*

Prone to false positives

Not so good with encrypted traffic

Tired, but not dead



Heuristics

... any approach to problem solving, learning, or discovery that employs a practical method not guaranteed to be optimal or perfect, but sufficient for the immediate goals ...

Host Based Heuristics

Combination of Signatures / Detonation / Static Analysis

Prone to False Positives

Can be slow

Simple Network Heuristic: port scanning







TTPs

<u>Tactics Techniques and Procedures</u>

Phishing Sigs + Malware Used + Infrastructure Cues

Create a behavioral profile and code as analytics logic

Often Implemented by SIEM as heuristics on logs

Can cover the entire killchain

Heuristics in Real Life

Kill Chain Coverage

Recon	Delivery	Exploitation	Beacon	C2	Fortification	Theft
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Effective at reducing noise – SIEM

Helped security products move past signature based AV

Limited by their design and predetermined logic

Require constant update


ML Example: DGA

Distinguish Legit domain from Algorithmically Generated domain

facebook.com

VS.

bysxkmhxikr2.com



ML in Real Life

Kill Chain Coverage

Recon	Delivery	Exploitation	Beacon	C2	Fortification	Theft
	***		(1)			

Resilient to zero days

Does not require white list, black list or notary service to be effective

Shines a light on encrypted traffic

Require retraining

Can be "falsey"



Behavioral Analysis in Summary

Kill Chain Coverage

Recon	Delivery	Exploitation	Beacon	C2	Fortification	Theft
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Able to detect zero days

Provides clues to data theft

Must account for periodicity

Requires burn in period

Over sensitive to change

Often suffers from false negatives



Intelligence and Context

Intel Sources Abound

Commercial

Open Source

All require active curation



Intelligence In The Real World

Kill Chain Coverage

Recon	Delivery	Exploitation	Beacon	C2	Fortification	Theft
	***		(7)			


Good at highlighting known compromised hosts and known infrastructure

Subject to rapid change

Targeted Intel is labor intensive

Sharing still ... not so good

Prone to false positives due to becoming stale





Punch Above Your Weight



-Demo -

Q&A

Thank You

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